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Introduction
Most people are conditional cooperators (Fischbacher, Gächter et al. 2001, Fischbacher and Gächter 2010) . They only cooperate if they are sufficiently optimistic that others cooperate as well. Conditional cooperation is an expression of (utilitarian) social preferences. Many individuals are also sensitive to deontological concerns, and even follow arbitrary rules (Kimbrough and Vostroknutov 2016) . But are they more willing to follow such rules if others do so as well?
Hypothesis
Individual 's utility is defined by
, where , , , ∈ . This creates a conflict between profit , and living up to norm . If the individual breaks the norm ( , she suffers disutility . She chooses if . The more demanding the rule (the smaller ), the more the individual is likely to break the rule. If the individual is a conditional rule follower, ∑ , , 0.
This leads to our
Hypothesis: The more members of the relevant community are known to follow an arbitrary rule, the more an individual is willing to follow the rule herself.
Design
Individuals earn a piece rate of .1 € for positioning anyone of 48 sliders to the middle of a line. There is an announced rule not to move more than sliders. However the instructions stress that the rule will not be enforced. Using the strategy method (Selten 1967), equals 5, 11, 23, 32 and 41. 1 Participants play the game twice. In the independent design, they decide on their own. In the dependent design, participants are randomly matched to groups of 6. First all participants make another unconditional choice, for each rule. They then decide conditional on the number of group members who follow the rule. After the experiment roles and rules are randomly determined. The independent and the dependent designs are paid out. We counterbalance order between both designs. We elicit beliefs about independent choices, measure social value orientation (Liebrand and McClintock 1988) , risk preferences (Holt and Laury 2002) , the Big5 (Rammstedt and John 2007) , the portraits value questionnaire (Schmidt, Bamberg et al. 2007) , and ask for demographics. 
Results
In the independent design, the more the rule is demanding, the less it is obeyed, as can be seen in Table 1 If they know that no other member of their group of 6 follows the rule, conditional choices closely mirror unconditional choices, see Figure 1 . Yet descriptively, already a single other rule follower makes a difference. With rule5, the probability to follow the rule increases from 17.5% to 19.17%, with rule41 from 36.67% to 39.17%. If all others follow the rule, 24.17% follow rule5, and 53.33% follow rule41. Order does not have a significant effect, except for the unconditional choice as a group member. If it is elicited as the second choice, it is lower. To be on the safe side, for all comparisons we use the choice when acting alone. Here we do not find an order effect. The regressions in Table 2 
This gives us our
Result: Individuals are more likely to follow a costly rule when they know that their peers do so as well.
The left panel of Figure 2 provides further support: even if (in the independent problems) they have no hard information, participants are closely guided by their beliefs about the propensity of others to follow the rule. The right panel shows that the effect of informing about the choices of others is strongest for participants who have been following few rules when such information was missing.
Figure 2 Explanations
left panel: independent choices, dv: mean fraction that obeys right panel: conditional choices, by number of members who follow rule (x-axis) and by number of rules this participant had followed in independent choice
The regressions in Table 3 provide a statistical test. 4 The more rules participants follow unconditionally, the more they also do when they can condition on the rule following of others. The less demanding the rule, the more it is obeyed. This connection is the more pronounced the more rules the participant follows unconditionally (interaction). The more others follow the rule, the more it is obeyed. The critical new information is the negative interaction between the number of rules followed unconditionally and the number of rule followers: conditioning matters the more, the less a participant is following rules unconditionally.
We find a small additional effect of social value orientation; apparently participants see rule following as socially desirable. By contrast the effect of risk aversion is insignificant. Participants are not concerned about the risk of being seen as rule breakers.
4
Since we use the number of problems on which a participant had obeyed in the independent choices for explanation, the difference between conditional and unconditional choices would be endogenous. .6
.8
probability Hausman test insignificant on linear mirror models for both models # problems: # of problems on which this participant obeyed # members: # of members who obey on this problem (from strategy method) *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p < .1
Conclusion
We show that individuals are more likely to follow an arbitrary rule the more of their peers are doing so as well. Deontological rule following is conditional. Whereas these results mirror findings on utilitarian conditional cooperation, we observe some important differences. For (utilitarian) social preferences, social information is a double-edged sword. It helps if conditionally cooperative individuals learn that their peers are cooperative; they are more likely to cooperate themselves. Yet if, instead, they learn that their peers act selfishly, they react by withdrawing contributions to the common good themselves as they do not want to be the sucker. By contrast, in our sample social information never hurts. It even increases rulefollowing when the conflict with profit is not too pronounced, and particularly for those who, without such information, are unlikely to follow the rule.
Our results are of high practical relevance. The law should not only promulgate the rule, but also showcase law abiding (Bentham 1789 ).
